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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Cullen R. Sims appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for
post-conviction relief.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The state charged Sims with felony eluding, aggravated felony DUI, felony
possession

of a

controlled

substance,

and

misdemeanor resisting

and

obstructing an officer. (R., pp. 68-70.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Sims pied
guilty to the aggravated DUI charge and the state dismissed the other charges.
(R., pp. 71-73. 1)
Sims filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging, among other things,
that his counsel was ineffective for not filing a motion to suppress evidence of his
blood draw. (R., pp. 4-6.) In his affidavit Sims asserted his blood "was taken
from me and given to the police" without his consent or a warrant. (R., p. 10.)
He further stated, "If the Motion to suppress would have prevailed, I would not
(R., p. 11.)

have entered into the plea of guilty."

Sims also asserted he

requested his attorney to move to suppress the evidence but the attorney told
him such a motion would be without merit. (R., p. 11.)
The state moved for summary dismissal of the petition on the basis that it
was unsupported by admissible evidence sufficient to show a viable claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel.

(R., pp. 101-04.) The district court granted

A more detailed factual and procedural history is set forth in State v. Sims, 2014
Unpublished Opinion No. 626 (Idaho App., July 17, 2014), a copy of which is
attached to this brief as an appendix for the Court's convenience.
1

1

partial summary dismissal, dismissing the claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel. (R., pp. 108-120.)
The district court denied the remainder of the petition after an evidentiary
hearing.

(R., pp. 125-131.) Sims filed a notice of appeal timely from the final

judgment. (R., pp. 132-135.)
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ISSUE
Sims states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err in dismissing Mr. Sims' petition for
post-conviction relief without conducting an evidentiary hearing on
his claim that his trial attorney failed to consult with him and file a
motion to suppress the results of the warrantless, non-consensual
blood draw conducted upon him?
(Appellant's brief, p. 4.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
Did Sims fail to present admissible evidence supporting a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel?
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ARGUMENT
Sims Failed To Present Evidence Supporting A Prima Facie Claim Of Ineffective
Assistance Of Counsel
A.

Introduction
The district court dismissed the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel

for failing to file a motion to suppress because "the allegations are generally
stated and not supported by material facts or are merely conclusory" because
Sims alleged that a motion to suppress the blood test should have been filed but
did "not provide additional detail, facts, or evidence as to the basis for filing such
motion, or if filed, how the motion would have been successful." (R., p. 112.) On
appeal Sims "asserts that the district court erred in dismissing his claim that his
attorney was ineffective for failing to discuss the ramifications of [Missouri v.
McNeely, 133 S.Ct. 1552 (2013),] move to withdraw his guilty plea, and file a
motion to suppress." (Appellant's brief, p. 5.) There are several significant flaws
in this argument, namely that Sims never claimed his attorney was ineffective for
failing to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea and his claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel for not filing a suppression motion is not supported by
evidence. Application of the relevant legal standards to the record in this case
shows the district court correctly granted summary dismissal of this claim.

B.

Standard Of Review
In reviewing the summary dismissal of a post-conviction application, the

appellate court reviews the record to determine if a genuine issue of material fact
exists which, if resolved in petitioner's favor, would require relief to be granted.
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Nellsch v. State, 122 Idaho 426, 434, 835 P.2d 661, 669 (Ct. App. 1992). The
court freely reviews the district court's application of the law. ~ at 434, 835 P.2d
at 669. The court is not required to accept either the applicant's mere conclusory
allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant's conclusions
of law. Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001).

C.

Sims Presented No Evidence Of Deficient Performance Or Prejudice
"Idaho Code § 19-4906 permits a court to rule summarily on applications

for post-conviction relief." Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798,
803 (2007)

"A court may grant the motion of either party under I.C. § 19-

4906(c), or may dismiss the application sua sponte under I.C. § 19-4906(b)." ~
Summary disposition of a post-conviction petition "is appropriate if the applicant's
evidence raises no genuine issue of material fact." ~ at 522, 164 P.3d at 802
(citing I.C. § 19-4906(b), (c)).

"To withstand summary dismissal, a post-

conviction applicant must present evidence establishing a prima facie case as to
each element of the claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof."
State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278, 297 (2003) (citing Pratt v.
State, 134 Idaho 581,583, 6 P.3d 831,833 (2000)).
In order to prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a postconviction petitioner must demonstrate both deficient performance and resulting
prejudice.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); State v.

Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137, 774 P.2d 299,307 (1989). Where the claim of
ineffectiveness is failure to make a motion, the "conclusion that the motion, if
pursued, would

not have been granted by the trial court,
5

is generally

determinative of both prongs of the [Strickland] test."

Sanchez v. State, 127

Idaho 709, 713, 905 P.2d 642, 646 (Ct. App. 1995).
Sims presented no evidence that his counsel performed deficiently in not
filing a motion to suppress.

An attorney's performance is not constitutionally

deficient unless it falls below an objective standard of reasonableness, and there
is a strong presumption that counsel's conduct is within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance. Gibson v. State, 110 Idaho 631, 634, 718
P.2d 283, 286 (1986); Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401,406, 775 P.2d 1243, 1248
(Ct. App. 1989).

"Although the failure to advance an established legal theory

may result in ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland, the failure to
advance a novel theory will not." Piro v. State, 146 Idaho 86, 91-92, 190 P.3d
905, 910-11 (Ct. App. 2008). Thus, mere failure to anticipate a change in the law
will not constitute deficient performance. Shoger v. State, 148 Idaho 622, 630,
226 P.3d 1269, 1277 (Ct. App. 2010).
Sims alleged that his attorney told him, prior to his entry of a guilty plea,
that a motion to suppress would be without merit. (R., p. 11.) That statement
was undoubtedly true. At and before the time Sims entered his guilty plea the
controlling precedent was State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 184 P.3d 215 (Ct. App.
2008). Like Sims, DeWitt was unconscious in a hospital, following a traffic
accident, when his blood was drawn.

19.:.

at 711, 184 P.3d at 217. The Idaho

Court of Appeals determined the blood draw was reasonable under both the
exigent circumstances and the implied consent warrant exceptions.
14, 184 P.3d at 217-20.

19.:. at

711-

Because the holding of DeWitt would have been
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controlling, there was no reason at or before the entry of the plea to believe that
a motion to suppress would have been successful.
To circumvent the problem that counsel's advice was undoubtedly sound
at the time it was given, Sims' appellate counsel attempts to effectively amend
Sims' petition. On appeal Sims asserts trial counsel's deficiency was failing to

move to withdraw the guilty plea in order to pursue a motion to suppress
pursuant to Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S.Ct. 1552 (2013), which was decided after
Sims' entry of plea but before his sentencing.

(Appellant's brief, p. 5. 2 ) That,

however, was the not the claim Sims asserted in his petition, which makes no
mention of any motion to withdraw the plea. (R., p. 5.) Likewise, in his affidavit
Sims contended he "would not have entered" a guilty plea had counsel made a
successful motion to suppress, but does not allege he would have moved to
withdraw the guilty plea he entered in order to pursue a motion to suppress. (R.,
pp. 10-11.) Sims' argument that the district court erred by dismissing a claim that
was not actually presented is meritless.
Even if the claim that counsel was ineffective for not moving to withdraw
Sims' guilty plea had been made it is without merit. In State v. Boehm,_ Idaho
_, _

P.3d _ , 2015 WL 774131 (Idaho App., Feb. 25, 2015), the defendant

moved to withdraw her guilty plea to misdemeanor DUI to pursue a suppression
motion under McNeely.

&

at *1. The Court of Appeals was "not persuaded that

the issuance of McNeely provided a just reason for Boehm to withdraw her guilty

Sims also specifically relies on Idaho Supreme Court precedents from October
and December, 2014, as the basis for his hypothetical suppression motion and
motion to withdraw his plea. (Appellant's brief, pp. 10, 13.) These cases were
decided months after the Idaho Court of Appeals decided Sims' direct appeal.
2
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plea" because "McNeely, by itself, did not analyze implied consent."

kl

at *7.

Counsel was not ineffective for failing to make exactly the same motion found to
have been properly denied in Boehm.
Finally, Sims presented no evidence showing he would have been entitled
to suppression under any law that existed then or now. The only factual basis for
Sims' claim is that, while he was unconscious at the hospital, "[his] blood was
taken from [him] and given to the Police." (R., p. 10.) Sims does not even allege
any improper state action that would implicate the Fourth Amendment. State v.
Kopsa, 126 Idaho 512, 517, 887 P.2d 57, 62 (Ct. App. 1994) (it is "firmly
established" that the Fourth Amendment is not violated by private searches).
Even if there were state action, and accepting that the blood draw was
conducted without a warrant or express consent, Sims has not shown the search
to be constitutionally unreasonable.

Although McNeely certainly removes any

per se exigency argument, it does not prevent the state from showing an

exigency in fact.

McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at 1563 (state may show exigency "in a

specific case"). Likewise, even if Sims were entitled to application of the Idaho
Supreme Court's recent decisions on implied consent, such would not prevent
the state from showing that implied consent was given by the act of driving and
not subsequently withdrawn.

State v. Arrotta, 157 Idaho 773, _ , 339 P.3d

1177, 1178 (2014) (implied consent may be withdrawn). Sims has presented no
evidence tending to show that these warrant exceptions would not have applied
in his case.
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There is no viable claim of deficient performance in this record. Under the
law in existence at the time of the guilty plea there was no viable basis for a
suppression motion. McNeely was decided after entry of the plea and would not
have provided a just reason for withdrawal of the guilty plea. Although McNeely
did limit the scope of the exigent circumstances exception, it did not address the
scope of implied consent. Implied consent was not limited by the Idaho Supreme
Court until 18 months later. Even if Sims were given the benefit of current law
limiting the scope of both exigency and implied consent, he has failed to present
any evidence that suppression would have been appropriate. Because there is
no evidence showing Sims could have prevailed on a motion to suppress at any
time, much less that counsel elected to not file a suppression motion based on
an objective shortcoming, there is no viable claim of deficient performance.
Likewise, there is no evidence of prejudice. When the alleged deficiency
involves counsel's advice in relation to a guilty plea, "in order to satisfy the
'prejudice' requirement, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and
would have insisted on going to trial." Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985)
(footnote and citations omitted). "Moreover, to obtain relief on this type of claim,
a petitioner must convince the court that a decision to reject the plea bargain
would have been rational under the circumstances."

Padilla v. Kentucky, 559

U.S. 356, 372 (2010) (citing Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000)).
Sims made the naked claim he "would not have entered into a plea of
guilty" if he successfully suppressed evidence of the blood draw (R., pp. 10-11 ),
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but neither claimed nor presented evidence that he would have abandoned the
plea agreement dismissing two other felonies to pursue what was at that time
(and still is currently) a completely speculative motion to suppress. Moreover, he
presented no evidence that he would have chosen to go to trial. Because Sims
presented no evidence of deficient performance or prejudice, the district court
properly summarily dismissed Sims' claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

CONCLUSION

The state requests this Court to affirm the district court's order summarily
dismissing Sims' claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for not filing a motion
to suppress evidence of a blood draw.

DATED this 9th day of March, 2~.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 9th day of March, 2015, served a true
and correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT'S BRIEF by causing a copy
addressed to:
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in the State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk's office.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
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Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.
CULLEN ROBERT SIMS,

Defendant-Appellant.
________________

2014 Unpublished Opinion No. 626
Filed: July 17, 2014
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk
THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
OPINION AND SHALL NOT
BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State ofldaho, Ada
County. Hon. Lynn G. Norton, District Judge.
Orders denying motions for credit for time served, affirmed.
Sara B. Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender; Shawn F. Wilkerson, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Lori A. Fleming, Deputy Attorney
General, Boise, for respondent.
MELANSON, Judge
Cullen Robert Sims appeals from the district court's orders denying his motions for credit
for time served. For the reasons set forth below, vve affirm.
I.

FACTS AND PROCEDURE

On August 9, 2012, police observed Sims driving and attempted to stop him in order to
serve him with an arrest warrant for a parole violation. Sims failed to stop, rammed his vehicle
into a police vehicle, struck another police vehicle, and sped away. While fleeing, Sims collided

with a third party. The crash resulted in an injury to the third party and an injury to Sims's

passenger. Sims was transported to a hospital for treatment of his injuries and a possible drug
overdose.
On October 17, 2012, the state filed a complaint charging Sims with two offenses--felony

eluding a peace officer and misdemeanor resisting or obstmcting officers, An arrest warrant

issued and an officer served Sims with the warrant on November 21, 2012.

On January 16,

2013, the state filed an amended complaint charging Sims with felony eluding a peace officer;
aggravated driving under the influence (DUI); possession of methamphetamine; felony
destruction, alteration, or concealment of evidence; and misdemeanor resisting or obstructing
officers. A magistrate bound Sims over on all but the destruction of evidence charge, and the
state filed a corresponding information.
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Sims pied guilty to aggravated DUI, LC. § 18-8006, and
the state dismissed the remaining charges.

The district court imposed a unified sentence of

fifteen years, with a minimum period of confinement of seven and one-half years. The district
court ordered that Sims receive credit for time served in the amount of 19 I days (starting from
the date of arrest on November 21, 2012, and ending at his sentencing hearing on May 30, 2013).
After sentencing, Sims sent the district court a letter requesting credit for 295 days. Sims
contended officers arrested him for the aggravated DUI on August 9, 2012. The district court
treated the letter as an I.C.R. 35 motion for credit for time served and denied it. The district
court reasoned Sims was not arrested until November 21, 2012, and that, although Sims may
have been in custody on other charges preceding that date, because the arrest \Varrant was not
issued until October 17, 20 I 2, Sims \Vas at large for at least a month before his arrest. Sims
thereafter filed another motion for credit for time served and included an affidavit and
attachments in support thereof. Sims again asse1ted he was arrested for the aggravated DUI on
the day of the offense (August 9, 2012). The district court found that the evidence submitted by
Sims did not demonstrate he was incarcerated on the date of the incident. Accordingly, the
district court denied Sims's motion. Sims appeals.

II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The question of whether a sentencing court has properly awarded credit for time served to
the facts of a particular case is a question of law, which is subject to free review by this Court.

State v. Vasquez, 142 Idaho 67, 68, 122 P.3d 1167, 1168 (Ct. App. 2005). We defer to the
district court's findings of facts, unless those findings are unsupported by substantial and
competent evidence in the record and are therefore clearly erroneous. State v. Covert, 143 Idaho
l 69, 170, 139 P.3d 771, 772 (Ct. App. 2006).
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III.
ANALYSIS

Sims contends the district court's finding that he \Vas not incarcerated on the date of the
incident is clearly erroneous. Sims also contends that, although he was served with the arrest
warrant on November 2 l, 2012, he was actually arrested August 9, 2012, for aggravated DUL
The state concedes Sims was incarcerated on the date of the incident. 1 However, the state argues
this incarceration was not attributable to the aggravated DUI charge but, rather, to a parole
violation in a separate case.
The award of credit for time served is govemed by LC. § 18-309, which provides in
pe1tinent pa1t:
In computing the term of imprisonment, the person against whom the
judgment was entered, shall receive credit in the judgment for any period of
incarceration prior to entry of judgment, if such incarceration was for the offense
or an included offense for which the judgment was entered. The remainder of the
term commences upon the pronouncement of the sentence ....
The statute's phrase "if such incarceration was for the offense or an included offense for which
the judgment \Vas entered" means that the right to credit is conferred only if the prejudgment
incarceration is a consequence of or attributable to the charge or conduct for which the sentence
is imposed. Vasquez, 142 Idaho at 68, 122 P.3d at 1168; State v. Akin, 139 Idaho 160, 164, 75
PJd 214,218 (Ct. App. 2003); State v. Hale, 116 Idaho 763, 765, 779 P .2d 438,440 (Ct. App.
l 989). If a particular period of confinement served prior to the imposition of a sentence is not
attributable to the charge or conduct for which a sentence is to be imposed, the offender is not
entitled to credit for such confinement; neither does the sentencing judge err by denying credit
under such circumstances. Hale, 116 Idaho at 765, 779 P.2d at 440.
Sims argues the district comt erred because one of the police reports following the
August 9, 2012, incident contains the following statement, "Sims was then taken into custody for
felony eluding and his otitstanding felony parole violation." However, an officer's narrative in a

The district court's finding that Sims was not incarcerated is clearly erroneous. However,
because we conclude the district court did not fail to award Sims any credit to which he was due,
remand is not necessary. State v. Pierce, 107 Idaho 96, 102,685 P.2d 837, 843 (Ct. App. 1984)
(Where a ruling in a criminal case is conect, though based upon an incorrect reason, it still may
be sustained upon the proper legal theory.).
3

police report is not dispositive of\:yhether Sims's incarceration was attributable to the aggravated
DUI. Rather, that is a legal determination for this Court to make. The record demonstrates that
the state did not file a complaint in the aggravated DUI case until October 17, 2012. A warrant
was issued for Sims's arrest on this same date.

Moreover, the record demonstrates officers

served Sims with the arrest warrant on November 21, 2012. Thus, we hold Sims's incarceration
could not have been attributable to the aggravated DUI charge until he was arrested on that
charge on November 21, 2012.
Sims further contends the district court erred as a matter of law by concluding service of
an arrest warrant constitutes incarceration. This argument misses the mark. The relevant inquiry
is whether Sims's incarceration from August 9, 2012, to November 21, 2012, was attributable to
the aggravated DUI charge. Given that that complaint ,,vas not filed until October 17, 2012, and
the warrant was not served until November 21, 2012, Sims's argument is untenable. The record.
demonstrates that Sims's incarceration from August 9, 2012, to November 21, 2012, was
attributable to a separate, no-bond warrant for a parole violation.
We recognize that State v. Horn, 124 Idaho 849, 865 P.2d 176 (Ct. App. 1993), may call
into question the correctness of the credit given in this case. In Horn, the state filed a complaint
in Ada County charging the defendant with forgery. An Ada County warrant was served on
Horn at the Gem County jail, where Horn awaited disposition of unrelated criminal charges.
After disposition, the state transferred Horn to Canyon County to answer unrelated criminal
charges.

The state then transferred Horn to Owyhee County to respond to more unrelated

criminal charges and thereafter to Elmore County, where even more unrelated criminal charges
were pending. At the conclusion of the Elmore County case, the state remanded Horn to the
custody of the Board of Correction to serve his sentence. Approximately 200 days after service
of the arrest warrant, Horn was brought before a magistrate in Ada County and arraigned. Id. at
849, 865 P.2d at 176. The magistrate released Horn on his own recognizance. Horn was never
incarcerated in the Ada County jail in connection with that ,varrant. On appeal, this Court held
Horn was not entitled to the 271 days that elapsed between service of the Ada County arrest
'.varrant and sentencing on those charges because Horn was incarcerated in different counties on
unrelated criminal charges.

Id. at 851, 865 P.2d at 178.

Thus, the incarceration was not

attributable to the charge or conduct for which the Ada County sentence was imposed. Id at
850, 865 P.2d at 177. This Comi forther explained that the determining factor was one of
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causation--whether the presentence incarceration was caused by the charge for which the
sentence was being imposed. Id. Pursuant to this analysis, the district court may have granted
Sims more credit than that to which he ,vas due. However, the state has not cross-appealed the
decision of the district comt and does not challenge the amount of credit awarded to Sims.
Therefore, we do not address this issue fmther.
IV.
CONCLUSION

The district court did not fail to award Sims any credit to which he was due.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court's orders denying Sims's motions.
Judge LANSING and Judge GRATTON, CONCUR.
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